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One obstacle faced by proposals of retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics
is the perceived high conceptual cost of making such a proposal. I assemble here a
metaphysical picture consistent with the possibility of retrocausality and not pre-
cluded by the known physical structure of our reality. This picture employs two
relatively well-established positions—the block universe model of time and the in-
terventionist account of causation—and requires the dismantling of our ordinary
asymmetric causal intuition and our ordinary intuition about epistemic access to
the past. The picture is then built upon an existing model of agent deliberation
that permits us to strike a harmony between our causal intuitions and the fixity
of the block universe view. I conclude that given the right mix of these reasonable
metaphysical and epistemological ingredients there is no conceptual cost to such a
retrocausal picture of quantum mechanics.
Key words: Retrocausality, Temporal symmetry, Interventionism, Quantum me-
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1 Introduction
It is no secret that by permitting retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics local hid-
den variables can be used to account for the violation of Bell’s inequality.1 But can we be
sure that such a retrocausal picture is metaphysically tenable? The metaphysics of retro-
causality is often broached in the philosophical literature in and around discussions of time
travel and causal paradoxes and there seems to be a general sentiment that there is nothing
manifestly self-contradictory about the idea, strange though it may seem at first. There is,
however, a significant challenge from the philosophy of physics literature: Maudlin (2002)
claims that retrocausality is fundamentally at odds with the “metaphysical picture of the
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0605-0.
1See, for instance, Argaman (2010), Costa de Beauregard (1953, 1976, 1977), Cramer (1980, 1986),
Hokkyo (1988), Miller (1996, 1997), Price (1984, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2008, 2012), Price and Wharton
(2013), Rietdijk (1978), Sutherland (1983, 1998, 2008), Wharton (2007, 2010, 2013a,b) and Wharton,
Miller and Price (2011).
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past generating the future” and thus cannot be entertained as a metaphysical possibility
in a reality such as ours. The plausibility of Maudlin’s metaphysical picture will not be
of concern to us here.2 The purpose of this paper is to counterbalance Maudlin’s picture
with a carefully considered metaphysical alternative that coheres with the possibility of
retrocausality and that is not precluded by the known physical structure of our reality.3
This project does not introduce any explicitly new metaphysical ideas; on the con-
trary, the picture developed here is a conglomeration of developed material from various
contexts that is merely collected together under the one roof. The goal here is to com-
bine these ideas into a single coherent picture which will assist us in forestalling some
perceived metaphysical problems with retrocausality. I begin by setting out in Section 2
two relatively well-established positions that will serve as a solid conceptual foundation
upon which to develop our metaphysical picture: the block universe model of time in
Section 2.1 and Woodward’s (2003) interventionist account of causation in Section 2.2.
There are then two metaphysical intuitions that must be dismantled. The first is our ordi-
nary asymmetric causal intuition: in Section 3.1 I describe Price’s (1996) argument from
temporal symmetry against the plausibility of extending our asymmetric causal intuitions
to the microscopic realm. The second is our ordinary intuition about epistemic access to
the past: in Section 3.2 I present Dummett’s (1964) argument against the possibility of
‘bilking’ that clears a logical space for retrocausality at the expense of our intuition that
our past is necessarily epistemically accessible independent of our own future actions. The
claim here is that quantum mechanics is a theory that occupies this logical space. This
then opens the way to build a symmetric picture of causation: in Section 4 I sequester
Price’s (2007) model of agent deliberation that permits us to strike a harmony between our
causal intuitions, such as free will and unidirectional causation, and the picture derived
from spacetime physics that future events are fixed within a deterministic and causally
symmetric framework.
It is often claimed that the introduction of retrocausal influences into the interpretation
of quantum theory is a higher conceptual cost to pay than the problems associated with
the rejection of local hidden variables. One way to imagine the choice between these
competing interpretational schema is in terms of ideological economy.4 According to
Quine (1951), the ideas that can be expressed in a theory comprise the ideology of the
theory. The ideological economy of a theory is then a measure of the economy of primitive
undefined statements employed to reproduce this ideology; fewer primitive statements
imply a more economical theory. Thus, the argument often made against retrocausality
is that its ideology is less economical than rejecting local hidden variables (and thus,
perhaps, embracing action-at-a-distance in quantum mechanics). The goal of this paper
2Though Evans, Price and Wharton (2013) provide some discussion of this point.
3By this I mean the nomological or mathematical structure of our physical theories, rather than
the ontology of the interpretation of that structure, which may or may not preclude the possibility of
retrocausality.
4This terminology is derived from Quine’s (1951) distinction between the ontology and the ideology
of a theory.
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is to show that introducing retrocausality incurs no ideological cost because the ingredients
required to build a retrocausal quantum picture of reality are given to us for free by the
metaphysical structure of our existing physical theories and the epistemological structure
of our experiences.
2 Foundations
2.1 The block universe model of time
We begin building our metaphysical picture with a temporal model popular among many
physicists and philosophers: the block universe model of time. Rather than modelling re-
ality as a three dimensional space evolving under the passage of time, reality is envisaged
according to this view as a four dimensional block of which time is a mere passive ingredi-
ent. In the philosophical literature the block universe view is thought of as characterised
by two claims: the past, present and future are equally real; and there is no privileged
instant nor objective flow of time through the block. The spatial and temporal relations
between all events in the four dimensional block are thus on an equal footing and exist
atemporally. This view thus forges a strong analogy between the conception of time and
our ordinary conception of space. Just as there is nothing objective about labelling a
particular position in space ‘here’ nor claiming the contents of ‘here’ to be more real than
the contents of ‘there’, there is nothing objective about labelling a particular time ‘now’
whose contents can be thought of as any more real than the contents of any other position
within the block.
The block universe model of time is consistent with a deterministic model of reality. In
a deterministic physical model, specifying data along a single hypersurface of spacetime
is sufficient to determine the events of spacetime past and future of the hypersurface.
Similarly, the block universe view is committed to the reality of all the events of four
dimensional spacetime.
2.2 The interventionist account of causation
The interventionist account of causation is introduced and defended by Woodward (2003).
The essential ingredient in this account is the notion of manipulability or control : accord-
ing to this account, we say that C is a cause of E just in case there is some possible
intervention that can be carried out on C independently of the remainder of the system
that will change E in some way or other, holding fixed all other properties of the sys-
tem containing C and E (that is, the intervention excludes other causes of E that are
independent of the intervention). Woodward’s account is explicitly counterfactual in the
sense that there need be only some possible intervention that can be made on C to bring
about a change in E. The advantage of this account is that it can be employed to provide
causal explanations without requiring that there exists a complete description of some
spatiotemporal process connecting C and E. To understand this account of causation
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more clearly, let us consider an illustrative example.
Imagine the ignition system of a car. It seems that we would want to say that the
turning of the key in the ignition (event K) is the cause of the starting of the car’s engine
(event E). According to the interventionist account we can say that K is indeed the cause
of E since it is possible to carry out an intervention on K, by not turning the key say,
that will change E in some way or other, in this case the engine would simply not start,
provided all the other elements contributing to the system were held fixed. We can in fact
claim a causal connection here without explicitly spelling out the mechanism by which
the turning of the key brought about the starting of the engine. However, this does not
mean that we cannot spell out such a mechanism if we wished.
Consider the mechanical chain of events connecting the turning of the key to the
starting of the engine: turning the key (event K) completes the circuit between the car’s
battery and the starter motor (event C) which then starts the starter motor spinning
(event S); the spinning starter motor then turns over the drive shaft of the engine (event
D) which starts the pistons drawing in and then combusting the fuel (event P ); the
combusting fuel powers the engine to start running (event E). We have a chain of events,
K → C → S → D → P → E, with a mechanical account of how each event brings
about the next. However, the content of any causal claim about any two of these events
according to the interventionist account of causation is not that there exists a mechanical
connection between the events. The key to the interventionist account is to imagine
that each of these events is a handle or variable that can be manipulated and controlled.
Accordingly, what makes each event the cause of the next is the fact that there exists
a functional dependency between the variables; that is, some possible intervention on a
particular variable will (over a range of conditions) bring about a consistent change in
the values of the variables further down the chain. If we were to intervene on the above
system by replacing the battery with an old or faulty battery, the starter motor would
fail to spin, thus changing the value of the variable associated with event S (on or off,
say) from what it would have been had we not made the intervention.
There are two issues which arise from this account of causation that will be crucial to
our characterisation of retrocausality later in this paper. Firstly, it will be beneficial for
our purposes here to view the interventionist account of causation as a kind of genealogical
account of how we, as agents, come to acquire the concept of causation in cases where we
have no possibility of intervening in the world around us. To begin demonstrating how
this might be the case, consider the way we might employ causal concepts to describe
a situation in which it is impossible for us as humans to intervene on the system. The
gravitational pull of the moon is responsible for the ebb and flow of the tides, and we would
want to say that the moon causes the tides’ ebb and flow. Even though it is implausible for
us to actually manipulate and control this system, we can attribute our causal intuitions
in this sort of case to an ability to extend our causal intuitions from cases in which we can
manipulate and control. Through our knowledge of the gravitational interaction between
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the moon and the tides, we can predict with confidence what the effect of some imagined
(but perhaps physically impossible) intervention would be if we could in fact bring it
about. It is this sort of knowledge which we usually gain by physical intervention and
experimentation that allows us to make claims about the causal relations that exist within
a system. Thus, it seems reasonable that we extend these causal notions to cases in which
we do not in fact have the requisite ability to manipulate and control.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that the interventionist account of causation is not
explicitly reliant on a particular temporal direction. The direction of causation is dictated
by the nature of the functional dependencies between the relevant variables describing a
system and the nature of the (actual or hypothetical) intervention we are considering. It
is the epistemic relation that we hold with respect to the different variables involved in
the intervention that align the direction of causation with the future temporal direction;
we control (and thus usually know the significant preconditions of) the intervention but
do not have epistemic access to the effect in the future independently of this control. We
will take this up again in Section 4 below.
I mention these features of the interventionist account here to highlight the fact that
an arguable consequence of this view is that our role as agents in the world can be seen
as at the root of our concept of causation. While I leave further discussion until later,
for now I simply wish tentatively to broach the outcome of this genealogical sketch that
a being who interacted with the world differently to us as an agent would have a very
different concept of causation to the one that we have.
With these metaphysical foundations in mind, let us now move on to dismantling two
of our ordinary temporal intuitions.
3 Dismantling intuitions
3.1 Macroscopic intuitions, microscopic symmetry
A familiar intuition, indeed one that seems almost trivial, is that the properties of inter-
acting systems are independent before they interact. This is built upon the observation of
many instances where this apparent principle holds true. In macroscopic systems, where
our physical descriptions are coarse-grained and statistical considerations are relevant, we
take this principle for granted. However, Price (1996, 1997) asks the question whether
we are justified in extrapolating this familiar macroscopic principle to considerations of
microscopic systems, which are far more fine-grained and where statistical arguments are
inapplicable. Let us consider Price’s analysis.
Firstly, it seems that the origin of this principle is related to the asymmetry of thermo-
dynamics. When systems evolve from states of disequilibrium (lower entropy) to states
of equilibrium (higher entropy) it is because the initial conditions are special; namely,
the initial conditions are low entropy. Thus, if we were to consider a macroscopic system
evolving in the reverse temporal direction, it would look strange because it would appear
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that highly correlated incoming influences were converging from disparate regions of space
(imagine a pile of rubble ‘un-collapsing’ into a building) and these would be associated
with a decrease in entropy. In such a case the violation of the principle that physical
processes are uncorrelated before they interact would be a direct product of the violation
of the second law of thermodynamics. Looking forwards in time again we can see that
the temporal asymmetry which manifests itself in the correlations between outgoing influ-
ences is a result of special (low entropy) initial conditions and not a result of an inherent
asymmetry within the laws of physics.
It appears to be assumed that this principle of outgoing correlations but incoming
independence holds with respect to fine-grained physical systems. In such cases, unlike in
the coarse-grained, statistical-level cases, such a temporally asymmetric perspective resists
explanation in terms of boundary conditions. The boundary conditions explanation is
usually applied in cases where the phenomena display the temporal asymmetry of entropy
change. In a fine-grained system, such as that of two particles which come together,
interact and then separate, there is no entropy gradient of the sort that arises from the
coarse-grained description of macroscopic systems to indicate a temporal orientation to
the interaction. The temporal reverse of the interaction would likewise lack an entropy
gradient as in the ordinary temporal direction; this is a function of the temporal symmetry
of the dynamical laws of the system. As Price (1996, 1997) argues, this undermines any
imputed assumption that outgoing correlations exist in one direction and not in the other.
Furthermore, unlike in the coarse-grained case, there is no observed asymmetry in fine-
grained systems that needs to be explained. Of course, we do indeed sometimes observe
correlations between, say, disparate particles in microscopic systems, and we infer that the
correlations arise from some past condition rather than some future condition, resulting
in an asymmetric picture of any previous interaction between the particles. But as Frisch
(forthcoming) argues, this inference is underpinned by an asymmetric assumption—the
initial randomness assumption—that claims that the values of the variables contributing
to the preconditions of the interaction are randomly distributed.5 In other words, the
initial randomness assumption makes use of the principle that the incoming influences are
uncorrelated, the applicability of which is precisely what is at question for fine-grained
systems. Thus, if we take Frisch’s analysis seriously, then the asymmetry between the
independence of incoming particles and the correlation of outgoing particles is not directly
observed for fine-grained systems, but is simply inferred based upon our macroscopic
intuitions.
Therefore we are left with a dichotomy between two physical principles at the fine-
grained level: temporal symmetry in the dynamical laws of physical systems on the one
hand and, on the other hand, the asymmetry of the independence of systems prior to in-
teraction. Given this dichotomy, one could make quite a persuasive argument against the
5Frisch (2012) argues that this assumption is crucial for developing causal representations that play
an important inferential and explanatory role in physics.
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independence of microscopic systems prior to interaction purely on symmetry grounds.
However, the point I wish to make here is not that the principle of incoming indepen-
dence and outgoing correlations should be abandoned altogether for fine-grained systems.
The goal of this paper concerns the ideological cost of a retrocausal quantum picture,
an integral part of which is the possibility for incoming particles to be correlated with
future measurement settings before interaction. In fine-grained systems where statistical
arguments are inapplicable, like the quantum systems at the core of Bell’s theorem, the
macroscopic origins and asymmetric nature of the intuition underpinning the assumption
that incoming particles are independent becomes starkly apparent. When this considera-
tion is combined with the fact that quantum mechanics provides no direct observational
evidence as to whether incoming systems are correlated with future measurement settings
or not (since it is not possible to observe the unmeasured system without destroying the
correlations—an issue to which we now turn), we see that there is sparse analytic grounds
for ruling out temporally symmetric causation in quantum systems. Thus if we take these
considerations seriously then the nature of the physics in this case does not preclude a
picture of reality that coheres with the possibility of retrocausal influences.
3.2 The bilking argument
In our normal conception of causation, causes precede their effects. A causally symmetric
viewpoint opens up the possibility that effects can precede their causes. This, however,
immediately creates some potential conceptual difficulties. To demonstrate these difficul-
ties, let us imagine a pair of events which we believe to be causally connected: a cause,
C, and an effect, E. Let us further imagine that this connection is retrocausal; E occurs
earlier in time than C. On first appearances it would then seem possible to devise an
experiment which could confirm whether our belief in the causal connection is correct
or not. Namely, once we had observed that E had occurred, we could then set about
ensuring that C does not occur, thereby breaking any retrocausal connection that could
have existed between them. If we were successful in doing this, then we would have bilked
the effect of its cause. This is the bilking argument.
The bilking argument seems to drive one towards the claim that any belief an agent
might hold in the positive correlation between event C and event E is simply false. If this
were the case then the agent would have to give up any belief in retrocausal influences
between C and E. Dummett (1964) disputes that giving up this belief is the only solution
to the bilking argument. In exploring the terms under which a belief in retrocausality
can be maintained, Dummett suggests that what the bilking argument actually shows is
that a set of three conditions concerning the two events, and the agent’s relationship to
them, is incoherent. In any incoherent set of conditions, all three conditions cannot hold
simultaneously. Thus, depending on which of these three conditions fails to hold, there
may be scope for an agent to maintain a belief that the later cause retrocausally influences
the earlier event. To motivate these conditions, let us consider Dummett’s own example.
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Dummett imagines a tribe to exist with the custom of sending young men on a lion
hunt to prove their bravery. The men travel for two days, hunt for two days and spend
two days on their return journey. Observers travel with the young men and report back to
the chief of the tribe whether the men acquitted themselves with bravery or not. While
the young men are away, the chief performs dances intended to cause the young men
to act bravely. Significantly, he performs these dances for the whole six days, i.e. for
two days during which the events that the dancing is supposed to influence have already
taken place. The chief notices that on occasions when he dances, he subsequently learns
that the young men had hunted bravely and, on occasions when he does not dance, he
subsequently learns that the young men had hunted in a cowardly fashion. The chief
thus observes there to be a positive correlation between his dancing and the young men’s
bravery and therefore maintains a belief in retrocausality.
Imagine further that we are to convince the chief that this practice of his were absurd.
We arrange that the observers who had accompanied the hunt return early and report
to the chief whether or not the young men had acted bravely. We then set a bilking
challenge to the chief to dance if and only if the young men had not acted bravely.
There are two possible outcomes of this challenge. If the chief accepts this challenge and
dances then he must concede that his dancing does not ensure the bravery of the young
men. Alternatively, imagine that the chief accepts the challenge and then discovers he is
inexplicably unable to dance, i.e. his limbs will simply not move. Then the chief would
have to admit that dancing is not an action which is within his power to perform. If this
were to occur, however, it would then be fair to say that it is not the chief’s dancing
that causes the young men to be brave, rather it is the young men’s bravery that makes
possible his dancing. Thus, regardless of whether the chief dances or not, it seems that
the chief must give up his belief in retrocausality.
It appears then that there are two incompatible conditions here concerning the chief’s
dancing: (i) there is a positive correlation between the chiefs dancing and the bravery
of the young men; and (ii) dancing is within the power of the chief to perform. If the
first condition is to hold, then the second condition must fail, and vice versa, as we have
just seen. Dummett, however, suggests that an implicit third condition can be violated
which allows both of these conditions to hold simultaneously and thus allows the chief to
maintain his belief in retrocausality. To see this, let us first consider an agent who believes
a certain action is effective in bringing about a subsequent event. Such an agent would
believe the action to be the cause of the later effect. Dummett recognises that there is
a connection between the foreknowledge the agent possesses about the subsequent event
and the intention the agent has to perform the action. The agent only knows an event to
occur in the future because they intend to bring it about by performing a certain action:
the agent possesses knowledge in intention. This is in contrast to knowledge of the past
which we can possess in more forms than merely in intention.
Let us then return to our example and imagine for the sake of argument that there
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is a parallel between the knowledge that the chief can possess concerning the bravery of
the young men and the case of foreknowledge described here, i.e. the chief only knows
that the young men are brave due to his intention to dance. This would then make our
bilking challenge inconclusive. Since we can no longer arrange that the observers report
the behaviour of the young men to the chief, we can no longer force the occurrence of
a negative correlation. If we further rule out that there are no inexplicable incidents
when the chief is unable to dance, then we are left with the original situation whereby
the chief merely observes a positive correlation between his dancing and the young men’s
bravery and the chief can thus maintain his belief in retrocausality. To arrive at this
result we have had to jettison the following condition: (iii) the chief has epistemic access
to the behaviour of the young men independently of his intention to dance. These three
conditions form a set which is shown to be inconsistent by the bilking argument.
Let us state these conditions in the more general terms we encountered at the beginning
of this section:
(i) There exists a positive correlation between an event C and an event E.
(ii) Event C is within the power of an agent to perform.
(iii) The agent has epistemic access to the occurrence of event E independently of any
intention to bring it about.
An interesting point to notice at this stage is that these conditions do not specify in which
order events C and E occur. If we consider why it is not the case that it is possible to
bilk future effects of their causes, this is because condition (iii) fails to hold for future
events. If knowledge about future events could be obtained independently of an agent’s
intention to perform certain actions, then it would be possible to bilk those future events
of their causes; this would amount, in a way, to changing the events we already know to
occur in the future. Since this sort of foreknowledge is not possible, we can consistently
believe our actions to bring about the future. Conversely, if it were the case that some
past event was known only through our intention to perform a certain action, then it
would be consistent to believe our actions to bring about the past.
The conditions under which it is possible to maintain a belief in retrocausality are
especially relevant to quantum mechanics. In fact, once we make a suitable specification
of how condition (iii) can be violated, we find that there exists a strong parallel between
the conditions which need to hold to justify a belief in bringing about the past and what
we find to be the case in quantum mechanics. Following the prescription of Price (1996,
p. 174), let us not suppose that a violation of condition (iii) entails that the relevant
agent has no epistemic access to the relevant past events independently of any intention
to bring them about, rather let us suppose that the means by which knowledge of these
past events is gathered breaks the claimed correlation between the agent’s action and
those past events. We can state our new condition as follows:
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(iv) The agent can gain epistemic access to the occurrence of event E independently of
any intention to bring it about and without altering event E from what it would
have been had no epistemic access been gained.
In the dancing chief example a violation of this condition would entail that every time
the chief attempted to discover the behaviour of the young men he subsequently affected
their behaviour to be different from what it would have been had he not attempted his
discovery. In those cases where the chief makes no attempt to discover the behaviour of
the young men, we are back to our original violation of condition (iii).
The nature of this weakened violation of condition (iii) should look familiar; it is just
the sort of condition we would expect to hold if the system in question were a quantum
system. To make this explicit, let us consider a simple quantum system as an example
to see that this is the case. Imagine a quantum system is prepared to be in a state ψ
at time t0 and at time t1 the system is to be measured; without loss of generality, let
us say that we are making a spin measurement at t1 (as we would do in a test of the
Bell inequality). In the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics the wavefunction
representing the system evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation from t0 until the
time of measurement at t1 wherein the wavefunction collapses to one or other of the
eigenstates of the operator associated with the measurement.
Let us now imagine that we are an agent who believes in a retrocausal influence from
the measurement setting at t1 on the state of the system after preparation at t0. To begin
with, we cannot subscribe to the view that the wavefunction description is a complete
description of the quantum state; due to the asymmetric nature of the measurement
process and the Born rule, there is simply no correlation at all in orthodox quantum
mechanics between the wavefunction after t0 and the measurement setting at t1. To
make a claim that there is a correlation between the state of the quantum system after
t0 and the measurement setting at t1, we simply cannot take the wavefunction to be a
complete representation of the quantum system. Thus we must subscribe to a hidden
variable account of quantum mechanics and interpret the wavefunction epistemically, as
representative of the possible knowledge an observer can gain about the system. In doing
so, we can stipulate through the subsequent quantum model that the hidden variables of
the system after t0 (corresponding to some spin states) are positively correlated to the
measurement setting at t1, i.e. that condition (i) holds. Furthermore, we will assume here
that we have the power to perform any spin measurement we like at t1, i.e. condition (ii)
holds. Let us now consider whether condition (iv) can also hold; that is, whether it is
possible to bilk our experiment.
Imagine how a bilking argument against our belief in a retrocausal influence might
run. We begin with a claim that the values of the spin state of the system between t0 and
t1 are correlated with the spin measurement setting we will freely choose at t1. A potential
bilker will attempt to somehow observe the actual spin state at some time t0 < tb < t1 in
such a way so as to establish a contradiction between the observation at tb and the value
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we would observe as a result of carrying out a measurement at t1. However, according to
quantum mechanics, as a result of such an observation there will be a new wavefunction
description of the system after tb that suggests the system is evolving from an eigenstate
of the operator corresponding to the measured observable at tb. Thus, in support of our
belief in a retrocausal influence from the measurement setting at t1 on the spin state of
the system, we can claim that any correlation between the spin state after preparation at
t0 and the measurement setting at t1 no longer obtains. The new wavefunction no longer
represents the evolution of the spin state between t0 and t1, as the bilker’s observation
has destroyed any putative correlation between the state and the measurement setting
at t1; the new wavefunction is now tracking the spin state between tb and t1 and we can
retrodict that the spin state between t0 and tb is correlated with the measurement settings
chosen by the bilker at tb. Thus the hidden variables characterising the system after the
bilker’s observation will not be what they would have been had the bilker not made that
observation; condition (iv) will consequently be violated.
Therefore, the very nature of quantum mechanics ensures that any claimed positive
correlation between the future measurement settings and the hidden variables character-
ising a quantum system cannot possibly be bilked of their causes because condition (iv) is
perennially violated. Moreover, we can stipulate further that the intervening observation
of the system by the bilker establishes a new correlation between the measurement settings
of the observation at tb and the hidden variables of the system between t0 and tb (and,
by the same logic, with the confidence that this correlation cannot be bilked either). The
significant detail of this picture is that (so long as we subscribe to the epistemic interpreta-
tion of the wavefunction) we lack epistemic access to the “hidden” variables of the system
and we lack this access in principle as a result of the structure of quantum mechanics.
(In the terminology of the next section, the hidden variables are unknowables.)
Thus, on a certain interpretation of the wavefunction formalism in quantum mechanics,
the hypothesis of retrocausality in quantum systems remains intact in the face of the
bilking argument. In fact, according to Dummett’s analysis of the bilking argument,
quantum mechanics has exactly the sort of dynamics we would expect of a retrocausal
physical theory; the counterintuitive nature of backwards-in-time causality can hardly be
seen as a disadvantage here. The fundamental structure of quantum mechanics does not
preclude a metaphysical picture that allows the possibility of retrocausal influences.6
4 Keeping up appearances
We now have a better idea of the sorts of limitations that constrain the picture of reality
that allows the possibility of retrocausal influences. We are now in a position to use these
constraints, along with the causal and spatiotemporal structures we have taken to be most
reasonable, to build a picture of what retrocausality actually involves. At the centre of
6Nor are hidden variables of this sort precluded by any of the quantum no-go theorems concerning
hidden variables, as these theorems assume that there is no retrocausality.
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this discussion will be the role that we play as agents as we interact with, and participate
in, the world.
Let us start first and foremost with two conceptions of influence that are commonly
conflated when talking about the future: the view that we change events and the view
that we affect events. Consider a claim like the following: by deciding to catch the bus,
I changed my day from one in which I was late for work, to one in which I was early.
Regardless of one’s model of time, there is an inconsistency in thinking that we change
events through our actions. For an event to ‘change’, the event must have been a particular
way in the first place. If we were partial to a dynamic view of time in which the future
were unreal, it would make no sense to think of a future event as being any particular way
before it is actual; there is simply no event that is my tardiness which can be changed
before I am in fact late. However, we have explicitly signalled our intention to employ the
block universe model of time and in such a model we can speak of future events as being
real and thus it might be possible for an event, one might say, to be a particular way ab
initio. We might say that my tardiness was an event and that this event changed into my
punctuality. But we must be careful here, because if a future event is real, it is in some
sense already out there in the four dimensional block. If we change it at some point prior
to it being a present event for us, we are left with the rather strange question: why was
it as it was before we changed it? Why did the four dimensional block contain an event
which was my tardiness, which then changed at some point into my punctuality? With
respect to the block universe view this question does not make any sense.
Let us take stock and see if we can clarify the above claim. We might do this by
saying something like the following: when we say that we change a future event, we mean
that we change it from being something that it could have been, say my tardiness, to
something that it now actually is, say my punctuality. Expressing what we mean by
change in counterfactual terms lets us sidestep the problems we encountered with the
reality of the events under question. However, the notion we have ended up with by doing
so has a significant causal ring to it (recall our characterisation of causation in terms of
interventions); this is in fact just what we mean when we use the word ‘affect’. I affect
my day to be a day in which I am early for work, rather than a day in which I am late.
I play a particular role in bringing about the future event and it is wrong to think that I
change it from something that it already was. As long as we commit ourselves to the block
universe view in which all events in the past, present and future are equally real, then
we must think of influence in the ‘affect’ sense. Furthermore, we can now see that this
argument is as much relevant to past events as it is relevant to future events. Under no
circumstances does it make sense to change the past in any way, since one cannot change
something that is already an actual event. Retrocausality is then not about changing the
past, rather retrocausality is about affecting the past: playing a role in bringing about a
past event.
This analysis is beginning to push us into a position about determinism and the nature
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of the block universe that may seem highly undesirable; namely, that we have no freedom
in choosing our own actions. If we cannot change the future in just the same way that we
cannot change the past, and if affectation is merely bringing about an event that in some
sense already exists, then it would seem that we are mere spectators of our reality in a
rather uninteresting sense. Fortunately, we are not pushed into this position by adopting
typically block universe notions as above. Moreover, coming to grips with why this is
the case will tie together many of the issues with which we have so far dealt and it will
give us our first glimpse at the metaphysical picture of reality that allows for retrocausal
influences.
The solution to this seeming incompatibility between the conception of reality as a
block universe and our ability as agents to control and manipulate our surroundings lies
in thinking of causation as a perspectival notion. According to Price (2007), evidence
suggests that causation is indeed a perspectival notion; we have already been introduced
to the idea when we were considering the interventionist account of causation above.
The tentative outcome that I flagged of what we called a kind of genealogical account
of causation in terms of intervention was that a being who interacted with the world
differently to how we interact with the world as agents (i.e. has a different perspective of
the world) would have a different concept of causation to the one that we have. Let us
consider how we can use this to help us find some sort of compatibility between the block
universe view and our causal intuitions.
The essential point to solving this problem is to realise that considering the block
universe ‘from the outside’ is availing oneself of a very different perspective of the world
to the one which we have while we are inhabiting some spatiotemporal region. The
important difference between the two viewpoints is that there is a discrepancy between
the parts of the spacetime block that are epistemically accessible from each perspective.
The spatiotemporally constrained perspective by which we are bound permits us only
limited epistemic accessibility to other spatiotemporal regions. This is significant because
it is as spatiotemporally bound agents that we have evolved and it seems reasonable to
suggest that we are in possession of a concept of causation that reflects this very fact.
Once we imagine ourselves to be omniscient beings that have epistemic access to the
whole spatiotemporal block, as we have done in the above analysis of change and affect, it
should not come as a surprise that our causal intuitions get confused when we attempt to
consider how a spatiotemporally bound agent can deliberate about whether or not to affect
a particular event that is already determined from our imagined omniscient perspective.
The solution that I am pushing towards here is that it is because we do not know which
events are determined to occur that we can deliberate, and therefore be causal agents, at
all. To reach this conclusion we sequester one final analysis concerning the relationship
between deliberation and epistemic accessibility, and the role this plays in our concept of
causation.
Price (2007, p.20) sets out “an abstract characterisation of the structural, or func-
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tional architecture, of deliberation” with a view to separating out the intrinsic features of
deliberation itself from those aspects of deliberation that are a function of our perspec-
tive as spatiotemporally bound agents. To begin with, a deliberator must be deliberating
over whether to bring about some particular occurrence out of a range of possible oc-
currences. Following Price, we will call the set of events of which this range consists
the options that the deliberator is considering. The set options can be thought of as
consisting of two subsets: all those occurrences over which the deliberator has immedi-
ate control, the direct options, and all those occurrences that can be brought about
indirectly via the direct options, the indirect options. All other events that are
not under consideration during the deliberation we will call the fixtures. An integral
subset of the fixtures is the set of events that the deliberator already knows, or are in
principle knowable, at the time of deliberation which we will call the knowables. The
knowables must be a subset of the fixtures since if these events are knowable to the
deliberator at the time of deliberation, then they cannot be under consideration to be
brought about and thus cannot be part of the set options. For this reason, all the events
in options must fall into the set we will call unknowables. Thus a deliberator makes
two dichotomous distinctions: the distinction between fixtures and options; and the
distinction between knowables and unknowables. The set knowables is a subset of
fixtures and the set options is a subset of unknowables. Let us now consider how
spatiotemporally bound deliberators such as ourselves might map these distinctions onto
the past and the future.
Considering the future first, we are going to want to say that much of the future belongs
to the set fixtures. This is largely due to the finite nature of deliberation: since we do
not deliberate about bringing about the whole future all at once, there are then many
future occurrences that we take as part of the fixed background during the deliberative
process. It also seems as given that the set direct options must also be comprised of
future events. We can attribute this to the fact that we are temporally constrained agents
of a particular sort; the set direct options consists of our immediate actions and we
simply cannot deliberate about whether to bring about our past actions, only our future
actions. Further to this, we might want to say that the set indirect options also is
comprised exclusively of future events, but this would be so only if we were committed
to classifying all past events as belonging to the set fixtures. Ordinarily, this is exactly
how we consider past events: as fixed. This is for the most part a function of the fact
that we consider the past as knowable in principle, and as we have seen above, the set
knowables is a subset of the set fixtures. But is it the case that our spatiotemporally
bound perspective commits us to the past being fixed?
If such a commitment is indeed a function of the fact that we consider the past as
knowable in principle, then it would seem that the possibility of the past being unknowable
in principle would purge us of this commitment. Recall that this is exactly the condition
we found to be suitable to avoid the bilking argument in the above analysis of Dummett:
14
an agent is immune to having a belief in a particular retrocausal correlation bilked if
the past effect in question is epistemically inaccessible to the agent at the time of the
causal action. In the language of our current analysis, if some past event belongs to the
set unknowables then it does not necessarily belong to the set fixtures, and thus an
agent is not precluded from counting the event as belonging to the set indirect options.
To see what this entails, consider the result from the last section that the structure
of quantum mechanics ensures that certain facts concerning putative hidden variables are
immune to the bilking argument. Thus, in the right circumstances, there is information
about the past of some quantum systems that is epistemically inaccessible in principle.
This implies, as we noted above, that hidden variables should belong to the set unknow-
ables. But now we see that it is not implausible that hidden variables (along with
perhaps other microscopic degrees of freedom that are epistemically inaccessible) belong
to the set indirect options. If this is the case then it is a live possibility that the set
indirect options contains some events which we would take to be past. Since the set
indirect options are just those events we take to be in our power to bring about, the
architecture of deliberation does not rule out the possibility of bringing about past events.
It is interesting to consider this result in light some of the analysis of this paper. There
is subtle connection between the knowables/unknowables distinction and the macro-
scopic/microscopic distinction. If we imagine a case wherein the value of some hidden
variable—say, a spin state—has been observed through some measurement procedure, we
would take such microscopic degrees of freedom to then be irreversibly coupled to a macro-
scopic system that registers the measured value. This renders the observed spin state part
of the set knowables, and thus it would no longer be possible for these variables to be-
long to the set indirect options. Indeed, one might argue that the observation of a
microscopic system simply consists in coupling to a macroscopic system (in many cases
that macroscopic system would just be us), and this would demonstrate the connection
between the knowables/unknowables distinction and the macroscopic/microscopic
distinction. Thus, any claim to a retrocausal influence in a physical system must be con-
fined to the microscopic degrees of freedom, such as the hidden variables in a quantum
system, since it is only those events in the set unknowables that meet the criteria set
out in this analysis.
This schematic of where retrocausality fits in to the structure of deliberation highlights
an important feature of a metaphysical picture that allows retrocausal influences: that
agents within such a reality will always deliberate towards the future, i.e. the set direct
options will always be comprised of future events. Thus retrocausality is not deliberation
towards the past, or in other words, it is not our normally directed causation in the reverse
temporal direction.
The way that any particular agent divides the set of all events into fixtures and
options, knowables and unknowables and past and future will depend completely
upon the agent’s spatiotemporal perspective. For spatiotemporally constrained agents
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such as ourselves, there is a specific recipe for how these distinctions are made which is
a function of the way we have evolved from within the spacetime block. If we imagine
ourselves as omniscient beings who are observing the events in the spacetime block ‘from
the outside’, all the events will be in the set knowables and thus in the set fixtures.
This is how we can imagine the spacetime block to be entirely determined without having
this intuition be in conflict with our usual sense of free choice in the deliberative process;
these are vastly different perspectives and causality is perspectival. It is the extent of our
ignorance, of both the future and of the complete set of prior causes of our actions, that
creates the illusion, so to speak, of free choice. This is where we then strike a harmony
between our causal intuitions, such as deliberation, and the intuition that future events
are fixed within a deterministic framework. The crucial element is to realise that we, as
spatiotemporally bound agents, are constrained in our epistemic access to the events in
spacetime.
5 Conclusion
This then is the package of metaphysical ideas that combine to give a picture that is
consistent with the possibility of retrocausality. We begin with two established meta-
physical foundations in the block universe model of time and the interventionist account
of causation. We then remove two potential obstacles originating in our ordinary temporal
intuitions: we realise that we have no evidence to suggest our macroscopic asymmetric
causal intuitions can be extrapolated to the microscopic realm and we realise that we do
not necessarily have epistemic access to the past independent of our own future actions.
With these obstacles gone, the emerging picture of a temporally and causally symmetric
reality viewed from an epistemically limited vantage point concords well with the possi-
bility of retrocausality. A significant aspect of this assembly of ideas is that none of the
included elements are precluded by the known physical structure of our reality. Indeed,
if anything, these elements are supported by the structure of at least one of our best
physical theories: quantum mechanics.
I began this discussion by claiming that a retrocausal quantum picture of reality
required no new ‘ideology’ in order to be plausible. However, one might argue that, while
perhaps no new ideology has been introduced, certain metaphysical issues, in particular
our notion of free choice, have become harder to reconcile with orthodox positions on the
matter. With respect to the analysis of the previous section, and true to my claim that
the required ingredients are already available to us, I point out that all I have espoused
here is a compatibilist notion of free will. Indeed, anyone interested in supporting an
eternalist position with respect to the ontology of time—wherein the past, present and
future are equally real—must deal with this very issue. Of course, this is not a treatise
nor defence of the compatibility of free will with, say, moral responsibility, but at the very
least compatibilism is a major player in this debate and could be considered a more than
plausible solution to the problem of free will. I would certainly consider this element of
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the picture presented here to fit within an orthodox camp on this matter.
But further questions do arise concerning the metaphysical consequences of a retro-
causal quantum picture of reality. For instance, what constraint determines the structure
of our epistemic access to the past and future? While we can point to the asymmetric
boundary conditions of the universe and the resulting entropy gradient as the beginnings
of an answer, this issue indeed requires further attention (and is presumably an issue that
receives a more straightforward response in Maudlin’s picture of the past generating the
future). More significantly, what sort of model of quantum mechanics is going to be able
to support this metaphysical picture? On this matter, I wish to mention two promising
areas of research that are arguably moving in the right direction to providing such sup-
port. Firstly, Spekkens (2007) outlines a toy theory that “reproduces in detail a large
number of phenomena that are typically taken to be characteristically quantum”; whilst
Spekkens’ project does not concern retrocausal quantum mechanics, it is based on a con-
straint that an observer has epistemic access to only half of the information concerning
reality. If this sort of epistemic constraint is found to underlie quantum mechanics, then
the picture presented in this paper may be a useful guide to further understanding on this
issue. Secondly, Wharton (2007, 2010, 2013a) pursues an explicitly retrocausal theory of
quantum mechanics based on the determination of physical behaviour by both initial and
final boundary conditions. Since we ordinarily lack epistemic access to final boundary
conditions, this again creates the sort of conditions integral to the retrocausal quantum
picture of reality I present here. While these works do not present a fully developed
theory or interpretation of quantum mechanics, they do suggest a way forward for the
retrocausal program.
While Maudlin is clearly correct in noticing that retrocausality is fundamentally at
odds with the metaphysical picture of the past generating the future, this by no means
renders retrocausality metaphysically untenable. Given the right mix of some reasonable
metaphysical and epistemological ingredients, an alternative metaphysical picture arises
that is consistent with the possibility of retrocausality. Moreover, the ideological cost of
these ingredients cannot outweigh the interpretational problems associated with the rejec-
tion of local hidden variables, such us the acceptance of action-at-a-distance in quantum
mechanics, simply for the fact that we were given all these ingredients for free by the
metaphysical structure of our existing physical theories and the epistemological structure
of our experiences.
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